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In Milliken v. Bradley [Milliken II],1 the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional the inclusion of educational programs in school desegrega-
tion decrees.2 During the decade since Milliken II was decided, federal
courts have ordered municipal and state governments to spend millions of
dollars' for educational remedies in school districts which have intention-
ally segregated students on the basis of race.4 Known as "compensatory
education," programs such as early childhood intervention,5 curriculum
development,6 reduction in pupil-teacher ratios,' counseling and career
1. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 21-45.
3. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 409 (W.D. Mo. 1987):
1987-88 Desegregation Budget
Public Information $30,000.00
Desegregation Monitoring Committee $256,228.00
Effective Schools $6,555,000.00
Reduction in Class Size $8,450,135.00
Summer School $1,295,764.00
Full Day Kindergarten $1,826,964.00
Before- and After-School Tutoring $233,759.00
Early Childhood Education $3,102,178.00
Long Range Magnet Schools $17,137,993.00
1986-87 Magnet Schools $12,257,529.00
AAA Achievement $6,340,614.00
Facilities Improvement (Interest) $353,061.00
TOTAL $57,839,225.00
4. Terms used to denote intentional or unconstitutional school segregation, as opposed to de facto
segregation which is lawful, include "de jure segregation" and "dual school system."
5. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 32 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affld, 807 F.2d 657 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Liddell v. Missouri, 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1050 (E.D.
Mo. 1983), affd, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Arthur v. Nyquist,
514 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), affd mem., 661 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1085 (1981).
6. See, e.g., Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344, 373-74 (W. D. Mich. 1981), affld, 698 F.2d
813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of
Indianapolis, 506 F. Supp. 657, 672 (S.D. Ind. 1979), vacated in part on other grounds, 637 F.2d
1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1016 (D.
Del.), affd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. at 28-30; Liddell v. Missouri, 567 F. Supp. at
1050.
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guidance,' remedial reading,9 and staff development 0 have become a reg-
ular part of school desegregation decrees.
Recent developments in the case law threaten the future of compensa-
tory education relief and suggest that some courts have not understood
Milliken Iis contribution to the Supreme Court jurisprudence defining
the proper scope of school desegregation remedies. This Note argues that
Milliken II extended prior doctrine by recognizing a broader range of le-
gally redressable effects of segregation. First, Milliken II created the pos-
sibility for the complete elimination of segregation's systemic effects; the
opinion sanctioned the remediation of any school practices or policies
found to be administered in a discriminatory manner." Second, the Milli-
ken II Court found it constitutionally permissible for federal courts to
remedy individualized effects, such as student deficiencies in reading and
communication skills, that segregation inflicts on the educational develop-
ment of black pupils. The Court recognized that these individualized ves-
tiges of segregation, which can persist despite a desegregating school sys-
tem's progress in combatting racial discrimination, require affirmative
remedial intervention if unconstitutional segregation and its effects are to
be eliminated fully.' 2
Milliken II marked an important advance not only for school desegre-
gation jurisprudence, but for equal protection doctrine generally. Anti-
discrimination law too often has failed to pay adequate attention to the
institutionalized nature of racial segregation, its ability to continue to visit
debilitating physical, social, and economic consequences on generation af-
ter generation of victims, long after intentional discriminatory acts have
ceased. 3 As Eric Schnapper has pointed out, "vestiges of past discrimina-
tion do not exist gratuitously or only to a small degree-creating system-
8. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. 132, 167 (N.D. Ill.),
vacated on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 506 F. Supp. at 672-73; Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F.
Supp. 569, 599 (N.D Ohio 1978), affld, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935
(1980).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 506 F. Supp. at 673; Reed
v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. at 598-99; Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538, 1551, app. C at 1572
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); Berry v.
School Dist., 515 F. Supp. at 376-79; Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 511 F. Supp.
1363, 1371 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 26-33.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 34-45.
13. See Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 855 (1983);
Laurence, One More River to Cross-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to
Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN 62 (D. Bell ed. 1980) ("White Americans deny re-
sponsibility for the position of blacks by denying that they have created a system of oppression that
will continue to exist and operate to their benefit until they have destroyed it."); see also infra notes
22-23.
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atic, pervasive, and enduring vestiges is what effective discrimination was
and is all about."114
Two emerging trends in the case law threaten to deny some black vic-
tims of segregation their constitutional right to compensatory education
relief. The Fourth Circuit recently limited the responsibility of school
board or state actors to eliminate the effects of their own unconstitutional
conduct on the educational development of black pupils. 5 In addition, cir-
cuit courts are formulating guidelines for the achievement of unitary sta-
tus that slight and even disregard the legal relevance of compensatory edu-
cation relief."
Section One of this Note examines Milliken I's contribution to school
desegregation jurisprudence. Section Two analyzes federal decisions ap-
plying Milliken II, setting forth the various remedial avenues pursued,
and criticizing the Fourth Circuit's recent Richmond desegregation case.
It argues that it is fully within the equitable discretion of federal district
courts to order educational relief for currently enrolled students suffering
individualized educational deprivation caused by their school system's
prior unconstitutional segregation, whether or not those students actually
attended the racially segregated schools. Section Three maintains that a
correct approach to terminating desegregation decrees must incorporate
Milliken Irs recognition that the elimination of all vestiges of segregation,
and thus the achievement of unitary status, may require educational relief.
I. Milliken II
The Milliken II decision significantly advanced prior desegregation ju-
risprudence by holding that complete remediation of unconstitutional ra-
cial segregation and its effects may require eliminating not only wide-
spread systemic or institutional effects of the violation, but also the
individualized educational harms produced by segregation. 7 The issue
before the Court was whether the Constitution permitted a federal court
to order the defendant State of Michigan to spend $8.5 million for four
compensatory education programs as part of a school desegregation de-
14. Schnapper, supra note 13, at 839.
15. See School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987), affg Bradley v.
Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1986); see also infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
16, The achievement of a "unitary" school system in which the violation of intentional segregation
and all of its effects have been eliminated is the goal of every desegregation remedy. See, e.g., Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 & n.4 (1968); see also infra Section III.
17. Just three years earlier, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [Milliken I], the Su-
preme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, which had upheld a district court order mandating an in-
terdistrict pupil assignment remedy to "achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation .... "
Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (E.D. Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, 418 U.S. at
734. The Supreme Court had found no interdistrict violation to sustain such a remedy, and remanded
the case, directing the lower court to formulate an intradistrict remedy aimed at eliminating the segre-
gation within the 71.5% black school district. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 752-53.
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cree.'8 Some state defendants had argued that remedying unlawful segre-
gation of students on the basis of race should be limited to correcting ra-
cially-skewed pupil assignment policies.19 While prior Supreme Court
doctrine had already rejected this argument, the Milliken II Court thor-
oughly dispelled it.20
Invoking the classics of its desegregation jurisprudence, the Court de-
rived a set of three principles to govern a lower court's exercise of equita-
ble discretion in school desegregation suits. 1 First, the nature of the de-
segregation remedy should be determined by the nature and scope of the
constitutional violation. 2 It therefore must be related to "the condition
that offends the Constitution."23 Second, the decree should be remedial,
designed as nearly as possible "to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct."'2 4 Third, in formulating a decree, the federal courts "must take
18. The four education components, proposed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant Detroit
Board of Education, were: revised testing procedures, new guidance and counseling programs, in-
service training for teachers and administrators, and a remedial reading and communications program.
See Milliken 11, 433 U.S at 272 & n.5. The Detroit school board had also proposed, in addition to
pupil reassignments, nine other compensatory programs that the State did not dispute. These included
programs involving school-community relations, parental involvement, student rights and responsibili-
ties, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education, multi-ethnic curriculum, and co-curricular
activities. See id. at 272 n.5.
19. See 433 U.S. at 273 n.8.
20. See infra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
21. The basic rule that federal courts should be guided by equitable principles in formulating
desegregation decrees was established in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) [Brown
III.
22. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
School desegregation case law follows the "corrective" approach to anti-discrimination law. See
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 728 (1986). Corrective principles call for eliminating purposeful discriminatory conduct and its
continuing effects in order to make whole the victims of a constitutional violation. For rejection of the
anti-discrimination principle's focus on eliminating intentional discrimination and its effects, see Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-70 (1976) (arguing for
"group-disadvantaging principle" which would eliminate those laws or practices that particularly hurt
disadvantaged groups); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1, 47 (1979) (remedy should be aimed at social conditions, not individual incidents of
wrongdoing); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1053-54 (1978) (antidis-
crimination principle exemplifies perpetrator's rather than victim's approach to racial discrimination
by reducing discrimination from being social phenomenon to merely misguided conduct of particular
actors).
23. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 738 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). Corrective approaches can be
broadly or narrowly construed. See Gewirtz, supra note 22, at 731. School desegregation remedies are
narrowly construed, directed not at broad continuing effects of slavery or one hundred years of Jim
Crow laws, but at eliminating the violation and effects of identifiable acts of school segregation.
24. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746.
The Court devoted only a footnote to the issue of the practical limitations that courts of equity
ordering compensatory education relief should consider. See 433 U.S. at 280-81 n.15. The Supreme
Court had held in prior cases concerned with pupil assignment remedies that its broad goal of elimi-
nating de jure segregation and all of its continuing effects might in some circumstances be sacrificed to
other interests. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 600 (1983) (Supreme
Court desegregation jurisprudence pursues interest-balancing approach in which costs may operate as
independent constraint on full vindication of victims' rights).
In Milliken I1, the Court reiterated its long-held position that "consideration must be given to
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into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."25
The Court turned first to the systemic effects at issue in the case: the
record revealed that two of the four educational practices in dis-
pute-testing and counseling-had been administered by the Detroit pub-
lic school system in a discriminatory manner. 6 The Supreme Court up-
held reform of these programs as crucial to eliminating the continuing
systemic harms of the dual school system.2"
The Supreme Court had for some time recognized that achieving a dis-
crimination-free public school system could involve more than addressing
pupil assignment patterns.2 In its 1968 opinion in Green v. County
School Board, the Court stated that the racial identification of schools
extends "not just to the composition of student bodies ...but to every
facet of school operations-faculy [sic], staff, transportation, extracurricu-
lar activities, and facilities."2 9 And in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, the Supreme Court said that the "first remedial re-
sponsibility of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial distinc-
tions" in these areas.30 Yet, the Milliken II opinion moved beyond these
cases in its appreciation of both the breadth of segregation's systemic ef-
fects and their unique manifestation in individual cases. According to the
Milliken II Court, the "condition" to be remedied was Detroit's de jure
segregated school system, and it deferred to the district court's specific fac-
tual findings as to which elements of the school system remained tainted
by discrimination and thus stood in need of legal remediation.31
burdensome effects resulting from a decree that could 'either risk the health of the children or signifi-
cantly impinge on the educational process.'" 433 U.S. at 280 n.15 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at
30-31). According to the Court, remedial decrees should "desegregate an educational system in which
the races have been kept apart, without, at the same time, losing sight of the central educational
function of the schools." Id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 764 (White, J. dissenting))(emphasis in
original).
However, the Court's concerns for interest-balancing centered on the costs of busing. In an exem-
plary footnote, the Court praised the district judge's "great pains" to devise a workable plan with a
minimum of pupil transportation. See 433 U.S. at 288 n.19. None of the limiting principles it had
derived in the pupil assignment area were applicable to the compensatory education components at
issue. See id. at 288.
25. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 281.
26. See id. at 274-75.
27. See id. at 282-83.
28. The Brown opinion itself discusses only segregated attendance patterns as the discriminatory
mechanism harming black pupils. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) [Brown I].
The arguments of NAACP counsel shaped the opinion. See Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five
Years Later: Looking Backward into the Future, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 615, 617 (1979)
("[T]he basic postulate of our strategy and theory in Brown was that the elimination of enforced,
segregated education would necessarily result in equal education.").
29. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968); see also United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395
U.S. 225 (1969) (upholding specific numerical ratios for faculty and staff desegregation). For a dis-
cussion of some courts' misapplication of these indicia in the termination case law, see infra notes
105-08 and accompanying text.
30. 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
31. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282. According to the Court, "discriminatory student assignment
policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a dual system founded on
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The Milliken II decision also recognized that merely eliminating dis-
crimination in current school practices will not always completely alleviate
systemic harms. New programs might also be needed to end ongoing dis-
crimination and to facilitate the desegregation process. Thus, the Supreme
Court upheld an in-service training program for teachers because the dis-
trict court had found it necessary both to instruct teachers and administra-
tors to treat all students in a non-discriminatory manner82 and to prepare
them to cope with the special problems presented by desegregation. 33
Milliken II's greatest contribution to desegregation jurisprudence was
its recognition that individualized effects of the violation must also be rem-
edied if the rights of black victims of segregation are to be vindicated. The
Supreme Court described the individualized effects caused by Detroit's
segregated school system:
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart
from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech,
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are
likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the
environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if
they are to enter and be a part of that community ...
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy the impact
of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger
and can be dealt with only by independent measures.3
Accordingly, the Court upheld the remedial and communications skills
program ordered by the district court, as "aptly tailored to remedy the
consequences of the constitutional violation."3"
Milliken II was not the first case in which the Supreme Court found
that harms which exist independently of current school programs and
practices are constitutionally redressable. In both Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education6 and Keyes v. School District No. 1,37
the Court devoted considerable attention to examining how unlawful
school construction and closing policies create segregated residential neigh-
borhoods, which in turn contribute to continuing racial segregation in
racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their eyes to inequalities, shown by
the record, which flow from a longstanding segregated system." Id. at 283.
32.
Teachers, both white and black, often have unhealthy expectations of the ability and worth of
students of the opposite race. Moreover, it is known that teachers' expectations vary with
socio-economic variations among students. These expectations must, through training, be re-
oriented to ensure that academic achievement of black students in the desegregation process is
not impeded.
402 F. Supp. 1096, 1139 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
33. See id. at 1139.
34. 433 U.S. at 287-88.
35. Id. at 287.
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
37. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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schools."8 The Court held in Swann that courts may order pupil assign-
ment remedies which correct for the residential housing effects of the prior
segregation.3 9
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of remedying indi-
vidualized educational harms until Milliken 11,40 federal courts of appeals
decisions for years had upheld orders of remedial education relief designed
to overcome the educational deprivation suffered by black students."1 Re-
medial rationales in those cases had included "compensat[ing] minority
group children for unequal educational opportunities resulting from past
or present racial and ethnic isolation . *."..42 Although the Milliken II
Court did not assess the constitutionality of these prior holdings, it stated
that they supported the Court's broader principle that "[compensatory ed-
ucation] programs may... be appropriate remedies to treat the condition
that offends the Constitution."' 8 Since the Supreme Court had defined
this "condition" as "Detroit's de jure segregated school system,"'4  it
clearly envisioned that any school system whose pupils bore the effects of
its prior intentional segregation remained a segregated system.4
In 1977, the future of compensatory education relief probably was un-
clear. The Milliken II facts seemed unique: the educational components
required minimal government expense; the plaintiffs and local school
board were aligned against the state; and though Milliken I had foreclosed
an interdistrict pupil assignment remedy, Detroit school children desper-
ately required some relief.' Over the next decade, lower federal courts
would give content to Milliken IIs equitable principles in the complex
desegregation suits that confronted them.
38. According to these cases, before accepting a school board's claim that private demographic
choices and not intentional school board actions created segregated schools, courts should scrutinize the
school board's own liability for contributing to segregated housing patterns. See Swann, 402 U.S. at
20-21; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211-12.
39. See 402 U.S. at 20-21.
40. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283-86.
41. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v.
United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969); Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ. of Savannah, 387 F.2d 486
(5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
42. 433 U.S. at 285 (quoting United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)).
43. 433 U.S. at 286 n.17 (emphasis added).
44. See id. at 282; supra text accompanying note 31.
45. The Court also stressed that eliminating individualized harms would require a considerable
amount of time and effort, for compensatory programs
were not, and as a practical matter could not be, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold
stroke .... Rather, by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record caused
significant deficiencies in communications skills-reading and speaking-the victims of De-
troit's de jure segregated system will continue to experience the effects of segregation until
such future time as the remedial programs can help dissipate the continuing effects of past
misconduct....
433 U.S. at 290.
46. See Gewirtz, supra note 24, at 656 n.197.
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II. Milliken II and the Lower Federal Courts
Many lower courts have invoked Milliken Irs remedial principles to
eradicate systemic and individualized vestiges of unconstitutional segrega-
tion.4 7 However, some recent opinions have failed to grant full relief to
individualized harms."8 Part A sets forth those avenues of relief which
have emerged in the case law to remedy systemic vestiges of school segre-
gation."9 Part B examines the federal courts' approaches to remedying in-
dividualized educational harms. It criticizes the recent Richmond desegre-
gation opinions50  and argues that, contrary to those holdings,
compensatory education relief should be provided in a school district when
the educational deprivation of its pupils can be linked to prior unlawful
segregation.
47. In order for its desegregation decree to be constitutionally permissible, a court must find that
the harms or conditions that its decree seeks to redress were actually caused by unlawful segregation.
See, e.g., Morgan v. McKeigue, 726 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1984) (portion of district court order mandating
school committee funding for city-wide parents council vacated where district court made no findings
linking expenditure to achievement of valid desegregation goals).
In order to disentangle the causal nexus leading to both systemic inequalities and individualized
educational deprivation, many courts have used a presumption similar to that invoked at the liability
stage to determine responsibility for the existence of racially identifiable schools. See, e.g., Vaughns v.
Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding district court
erred in placing on plaintiffs burden of proving that present racial disparities in placement in special
education and gifted programs were causally related to pre-1973 segregation); Oliver v. Kalamazoo
Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 811 (6th Cir. 1980) (agreeing that "at the inception of a desegregation
effort . . . the district court could, in ordering ancillary programs, presume that the disparity in
achievement was related to the segregated schools"). But see Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th
Cir. 1981) (arguing in context of school discipline that "[t]oo many legitimate, non-racial factors are
involved to permit an inference of discriminatory purpose from a showing of disproportionate impact,
even when it occurs in the context of on-going desegregation efforts.").
This Keyes presumption shifts the burden of proof to constitutional violators to prove that condi-
tions of segregation are not the result of intentionally discriminatory actions on their part. See Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,
537-38, 541 (1979) [Dayton II]. But see Goodman, Some Reflections on the Supreme Court and
School Desegregation, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE Crry 45-83 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman
& C. Schelling eds. 1981) (challenging causal hypothesis underlying presumption that prior segrega-
tion has shaped present racial composition of violator school districts).
The most important underlying rationales for the imposition of burdens of proof are probability,
fairness, and policy. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209 (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d
ed. 1940)) (burden of proof issue "merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the
different situations"); Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After A Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653, 657-60 (1987).
Courts have borrowed the burden-shifting techniques traditionally applied to pupil assignment ef-
fects for the purpose of assessing responsibility for systemic and individualized educational harms. In
doing so, these courts have affirmed Milliken IIs holding that such harms also be seen as a "condition
that offends the Constitution." See supra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
48. See discussion infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
49. Some compensatory education programs, such as pre-kindergarten or summer school, can
achieve the elimination of both systemic and individualized harms. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639
F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70
(1987) (ordering many compensatory education programs both to facilitate voluntary inter-district
transfer scheme and to eliminate educational deprivation suffered by individual students in the Kansas
City, Missouri, school district as result of prior unlawful segregation).
50. See Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1986), affd sub nom. School Bd. of
Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
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A. Eliminating Systemic Educational Effects
In applying Milliken H to remedy the systemic vestiges of school segre-
gation, three remedial goals have emerged in the case law: eliminating
continuing discriminatory educational practices;"1 facilitating pupil reas-
signment;52 and maintaining or inducing integrated attendance patterns.5"
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District
No. 154 illustrates the use of compensatory programs to eliminate the con-
tinuing vestiges of a segregated school system that persist as discrimina-
tory educational practices. The district court approved new procedural
safeguards proposed by the North Little Rock School District for deter-
mining the assignment of students to special education and gifted pro-
grams, after finding that the District had administered such programs in a
discriminatory fashion.5 5 Plaintiffs had alerted the court to the fact that
twenty percent of the black student body had been classified as mentally
retarded or learning disabled; the court found that "[n]o valid testing pro-
cedure could end up placing one out of every four or five children in
special education."56 In addition, only 9.4% of the gifted program students
were black; according to the court, this was "an underrepresentation of
blacks in the gifted program of 6.8 standard deviations, which would oc-
cur only seven times in a billion by chance."'57
In Evans v. Buchanan,5  which exemplifies the goal of facilitating pu-
pil reassignment, the Third Circuit upheld, among other remedial compo-
nents, programs which the district court had ordered in the areas of
human relations, in-service training, and special counseling "to help stu-
dents, parents, and faculty deal with the various pressures which arise as
51. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County, 584 F. Supp. 328, 349 (E.D. Ark.
1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff d, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980).
52. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1015 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
53. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26-35 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff d, 807 F.2d 657
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
54. 659 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (ordering remedy), vacated in part on other grounds,
839 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1988); 584 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (finding liability), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).
55. See 659 F. Supp. at 367-68; 584 F. Supp. at 349.
In the Cleveland desegregation litigation, Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978),
afftd, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980), the district court found that
racially imbalanced classes were partly the result of stereotyped counselling practices and course offer-
ings. Among other things, the court ordered the defendant school board to "institute an effective non-
discriminatory counselling and career guidance program... to ensure that students [were] counselled
on a racially nondiscriminatory basis as to opportunities in employment or higher education and as to
vocational and special educational programs." Id. at 599.
56. Little Rock, 584 F. Supp. at 349.
57. Id.
58. 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), affg 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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a result of desegregation." '59 Inducing integrated attendance or maintain-
ing white enrollment has also become a widely-invoked rationale for or-
dering compensatory education relief.60 For example, in Arthur v. Ny-
quist,1 early childhood centers, special academies, and a general
upgrading of the school system were ordered to maintain or attract the
white enrollment needed to eliminate attendance pattern disparities caused
by prior discrimination.62 The Second Circuit applauded the success of
the district court in achieving desegregative goals with a minimum of
mandatory busing "by establishing innovative programs .
B. Eliminating Individualized Educational Effects
Federal cases ordering the eradication of individualized vestiges of seg-
regation seek two remedial goals: remedying the individualized educa-
tional deprivation of currently enrolled pupils caused by the prior discrim-
inatory acts of a school district or state actor,6 and removing
individualized harms caused by the continuing racial isolation of students
who will remain in racially identifiable schools under a desegregation
plan.6"
59. Id. at 769 (emphasis in original).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538, 1541-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (ordering magnet schools offering early childhood and other specialized educational programs as
means to promote integration), affid, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2821
(1988); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1309-12, 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding implementa-
tion of magnet schools and system-wide quality education improvements to encourage white enroll-
ment), aft'g 567 F. Supp. 1037 (E. D. Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
Although the issue of resegregation was not addressed specifically in Milliken II, the opinion's
remedial jurisprudence easily supports an integration-inducing rationale for compensatory education.
One of the systemic harms of segregation is the continued existence of segregated attendance patterns
and racially identifiable schools. Thus, educational programs designed to support or promote integra-
tion are clearly related to the goal of eliminating these discriminatory vestiges.
61. 514 F. Supp. 1133 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), affd mem., 661 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1085 (1981).
62. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
Some scholars have cautioned that to the extent that compensatory programs are viewed primarily
as a tool to induce integration, remedial programs designed to cure black educational deprivation may
be sacrificed to general systemic improvements intended to attract white pupils. See Crain & Mahard,
How Desegregation Orders May Improve Minority Academic Achievement, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 693, 707 (1982) ("Concentration on methods designed to prevent white flight increases the
likelihood that district funds will be diverted into services appealing to middle-class white parents at
the expense of sacrificing compensatory and human relations programs meeting minority needs."). For
a similar criticism levelled against the St. Louis desegregation plan, see D. MONTI, A SEMBLANCE OF
JUSTICE: ST. Louis SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND ORDER IN URBAN AMERICA (1985) (same school
board which resisted liability for segregation for years was able to utilize school desegregation man-
date to increase their legitimacy as proper policy-making authority for public education and to achieve
funds to upgrade system with secondary priority given to black grievances); Snider, Increased Push
for Desegregation Urged, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 11, 1987, at 15, col. 3 (St. Louis school officials criti-
cized for lack of progress in implementing special academic programs in predominantly black city
schools).
63. 712 F.2d at 811.
64. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24-26 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff d, 807 F. 2d
657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344, 369
(W.D. Mich. 1981), aoffd, 698 F. 2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983).
65. See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1314 (8th Cir. 1984), affg 567 F. Supp. 1037
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In Berry v. School District,66 the district court ordered a social skills
and achievement program as part of its desegregation plan with the goal
of raising student achievement scores within the district to reach the aver-
age attained by students statewide. The Berry court had found that de-
fendants "caused," "condoned," and "perpetuated" the "measurably re-
duced" achievement of black pupils.67 According to the court, the
achievement program was "crucial to any complete and effective remedia-
tion" of that harm.a8
Similarly, in Jenkins v. Missouri6P9 the district court ordered special re-
medial education programs after finding that segregation had caused a
systemwide reduction in student achievement in the schools of the Kansas
City Metropolitan School District.7" The court ordered, among other com-
ponents, reduced class size, summer school programs, full-day kindergar-
ten, and early childhood development programs in order to increase stu-
dent achievement levels. 7
Courts have also ordered remedial relief for students remaining in all-
black schools under a desegregation plan."2 In Liddell v. Missouri,"3 addi-
(E.D. Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 588
F. Supp. 132, 159 (N.D. Ill.), vacated on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
66. 515 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Mich. 1981), affid, 698 F. 2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 892 (1983).
67. See id. at 369. Other evidence of individualized harm might include drop-out and retention
rates, and comparative statistics on black and white or district and non-district students that indicate
the percentage of students reading at below-grade level, those graduating from high school in four
years, and those continuing their education. See Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 694-96 (E.D.
Va. 1986), affd sub nom. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
68. 515 F. Supp. at 369.
69. 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 70 (1987).
70. See id. at 24; see also infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. Test results from the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills in grades 1 through 6 showed that only a few elementary schools of the fifty in the
system were performing at or above the national norm in reading and mathematics. 639 F. Supp. at
24.
71. See 639 F. Supp. at 28-33.
72. One major proponent of the use of compensatory education in all-black schools to replace
mandatory busing is Derrick Bell. See Bell, The Burdens of Brown on Blacks: History-Based Obser-
vations on a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. CENT. L. J. 25, 37 (1975) [hereinafter Bell, Burdens of
Brown] ("Effective schools are far more essential to the 'equal educational opportunity' promise in
Brown than the achievement of racial balance in the student population .... "); see also D. BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, 120-21 (1987); Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in
SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 13, at 125.
Bell claims that denial of equal educational opportunity, not segregation, was the primary violation
in Brown. See Bell, Burdens of Brown, supra, at 36. But see Jones, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J.
378, 379 (1976) ("[Slegregation is itself the deepest educational harm because it is the result of insti-
tutional racism and a condition of state-imposed racial caste."); Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegrega-
tion Remedy, 57 B.U.L. REV. 39, 48 (1977) ("[T]he main remedy is desegregation itself. Ancillary
[compensatory] remedies have the smaller role of ending the lingering effects of the past violation and
giving desegregation a fair chance to operate."); Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 688 (E.D. Va.
1986) (redressing educational harms is ancillary to "primary goal of eliminating segregation itself"),
affld sub nom. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987). The debate over
the primacy of various aspects of the constitutional violation ignores the power of corrective principles
to reach segregated attendance patterns and racial identifiability, as well as educational harms. See
Gewirtz, supra note 22, at 774. For an approach to the violation emphasizing school governance, see
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tional class size reduction, and after-school remediation were ordered for
such schools on the theory that "[wihen no other feasible desegregation
techniques exist, then specific remedial programs for students in the re-
maining one-race schools may be included as a means of ensuring equal
educational opportunity.""4
Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit has placed a new constitutional
limitation on the provision of educational remedies to correct individual-
ized harms linked to prior unlawful segregation. In Bradley v. Baliles, 7
Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1041, 1043 (1984).
Bell also argues that court-ordered desegregation may inflict equal or more harm on black pupils
than racially isolated compensatory programs, but he inadequately supports his empirical claim. See
Bell, Burdens of Brown, supra, at 31 & nn. 27-28. The available social science evidence and experi-
ence indicate that an integrated education best prepares black children for participation in a pluralistic
society, and that educational resources are most likely to flow to schools where white students are
enrolled. See Gewirtz, supra note 22, at 776; W. HAWLEY & S.J. ROSENHOLTZ, ACHIEVING QUAL-
rY INTEGRATED EDUCATION (1986); see also CRAIN, HAWES, MILLER & PEICHERT, A LONGITU-
DINAL STUDY OF A METROPOLITAN VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION PLAN (National Institute of Ed-
ucation Report No. 6-81-0062, 1984) (black males attending desegregated schools more likely to
graduate from high school, complete more years of college, perceive less discrimination in college and
other areas of adult life, experience less difficulty with police, closer social contact with whites as
adults, and more likely to live in desegregated housing); R.L. CRAIN & J. STRAUSS, SCHOOL DESEG-
REGATION AND BLACK OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENTS, RESULTS FROM A LONG-TERM ExPERI-
MENT 1 (1985) (desegregated students working in occupations less commonly held by blacks, more
likely to be working in white-collar and professional jobs in private sector); DAWKINS & BRADDOCK,
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS TO LOCATE DESEGREGATED EM-
PLOYMENT (1985) (desegregation in adulthood helps blacks to use biracial social networks to obtain
better employment).
This Note does not dispute Bell's claim that in certain circumstances, retaining black children in a
segregated setting may outweigh the benefits of pupil assignment. In the Dallas desegregation litiga-
tion, compensatory education programs were ordered in lieu of achievable integration. See, e.g.,
Tasby v. Wright, 585 F. Supp. 453, 458 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (permitting resegregation of 2300 black
children for purposes of remedial education in all-black schools), affd sub nom. Tasby v. Black
Coalition to Maximize Educ., 771 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (additional K-3 busing rejected in part because of compensatory education pro-
grams already instituted in all-black schools), rev'd in part on other grounds, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.
1983). However, before invoking compensatory programs as an adequate substitute for pupil reassign-
ment, the court should have made an explicit factual finding that this resegregation-plus-
compensatory education plan provided meaningful and immediate relief when compared to other more
effective feasible alternatives. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). For
example, the court should have explained why it was that compensatory education programs could not
be established in the partially integrated schools to which the students were being bused. In Dallas,
where partial integration was all that was possible within the majority black school district, perhaps
the court could have made such a finding.
73. 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), affg 567 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 816 (1984).
74. Id. at 1314; see also Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1,
778 F.2d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1985) (compensatory and remedial programs should be put into effect in
non-integrated schools), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). The Eighth Circuit held correctly that as
a matter of law racially identifiable schools may receive additional compensation to assure equality of
educational opportunity within the school district. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1314. But see Bradley v.
Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 694-95 (E.D. Va. 1986) (rejecting factual basis for assumption that ra-
cially isolated students in Richmond require more educational assistance, but using flawed
methodology).
75. The Richmond school desegregation case, Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va.
1986), affd sub nom. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987), has a
tortured history extending for more than twenty years. In 1966, after finding defendant Richmond
Public Schools liable for unlawful segregation, the district court approved a "freedom of choice" stu-
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the district court declared and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that it was
"not within the [c]ourt's power" to remedy educational harms suffered by
pupils who did not themselves attend de jure segregated schools. 6 This
self-imposed limitation on the district courts' remedial power conflicts
with the practice of other federal courts which consider the effects of past
segregation to include the educational deficiencies of current students
caused by segregation-linked poverty." Neither Milliken IPs affirmative
remedial principles nor its guidelines for limiting the exercise of equitable
discretion in school desegregation cases preclude the courts from remedy-
ing such harms.
The Bradley court admitted that prior segregation had inflicted educa-
tional and socioeconomic injury on the black parents of current school
children, and that these injuries had contributed to the children's poor
academic performance: "[O]ne of the reasons for the high poverty rate in
Richmond is the inferior education that was provided to blacks under the
former dual system" and "one of the primary causes of the previous low
achievement levels of RPS students was the high incidence of poverty in
the system."'7 8 The plaintiffs' expert witness at trial had presented a com-
prehensive analysis of data gathered from current students and parents
which indicated a direct and statistically significant relationship between
the low achievement scores of current school children and the degree to
which their parents had been subjected to segregation." Nonetheless, the
dent assignment plan, which was subsequently amended in 1971 to require extensive mandatory reas-
signment. In 1972, the district court also found several surrounding school districts and the State
Board of Education, which the plaintiffs had joined as additional defendants, liable for the unconstitu-
tional segregation within Richmond. After holding that its 1971 desegregation plan would be ineffec-
tive in producing stable desegregation, the court ordered the consolidation of the majority-black Rich-
mond school district with the surrounding majority-white districts. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that an interdistrict remedy was not justified as there was insufficient evidence of an
interdistrict violation. In 1984, the plaintiffs, with the Richmond Public School Board realigned as a
plaintiff, brought a claim alleging that the State had failed in its constitutional obligation to eradicate
the vestiges of segregation in the Richmond schools. See id. at 681-82.
76. Id. at 690-91; 829 F.2d at 1313-14.
This Note focuses on the legal arguments presented in the Bradley case on the issue of relief for
individualized educational harms. Analysis of other problematic aspects of the lower court decision,
such as its erroneous factual findings, are beyond the scope of this Note.
77. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 659 F. Supp.
363, 368 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (approving special testing, teacher aides, supplemental reading instruction
for "educationally disadvantaged" children "who continue to suffer the trickle down effects of past
segregation .. ... "), vacated in part on other grounds, 839 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1986); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), afflg 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding liability)
(discussed infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text), 639 F. Supp. 19 (W. D. Mo. 1985) (ordering
remedy), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Kelley v. Metropolitan School Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814
(6th Cir. 1982), afflg 511 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-69 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (awarding educational
remediation programs for "those schools or classes where the achievement levels are below the average
for the system and/or where the majority of a school's population is made up largely of socio-
economically deprived children who suffer the continuing effects of prior discrimination"), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
78. Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 690 (E.D. Va. 1986), aOffd sub nom. School Bd. of
Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
79. See Brief for Appellants at 34, School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir.
1987)(No. 86-3106).
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court concluded that it was constitutionally barred from recognizing these
effects as remediable.
In contrast, the district court's opinion in Jenkins v. Missouri,"0 upheld
by the Eighth Circuit, quite easily recognized educational harms produced
by segregation-related poverty as a basis for legal relief. The Jenkins
court found that thirty years after state-mandated segregation had ceased
in Missouri, black Kansas City schoolchildren's low achievement scores
reflected the lingering effects of the old dual system. 1 Review of the trial
transcript citations noted by the district court in its factual findings reveals
that the court repeatedly referred to testimony indicating that the dual
school system had generated the black poverty in Kansas City:
[Tjhe dual system, in addition to causing low achievement which
continues among blacks, generated a large, isolated poverty ghetto
which reduced economic opportunities for familes[sic] and children,
and in doing that, in turn created more low achievement, such that it
wound up being a cycle, low achieving students with little chance to
succeed economically who then raise children in a difficult environ-
ment and difficult schools in which their children fail. 2
Yet, according to the district court in Bradley, because pupils currently
enrolled in the Richmond public schools had never attended de jure segre-
gated schools, the only remediable educational harms were those existing
within the school system itself."3 Any individualized effects that the prior
school segregation may have had on current Richmond Public School stu-
dents were deemed "indirect," and therefore irremediable.
The court's characterization of the individualized harms as "indirect"
and those remaining in the school system itself as "direct" reveals a bias
in its remedial theory which is unsupported by Milliken H1.84 According to
80. 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 70 (1987).
81. See id. at 1492. The court stated its findings of fact regarding the Kansas City, Missouri
School District:
Several witnesses confirmed the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Brown I that
forced segregation ruins attitudes and is inherently unequal: '[Segregation] may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.' The general attitude of inferiority
among blacks produces low achievement which ultimately limits employment opportunities and
causes poverty. While it may be true that poverty results in low achievement regardless of race,
it is undeniable that most poverty-level families are black. The District stipulated that as of
1977 they had not eliminated all the vestiges of the prior dual system. The Court finds the
inferior education indigenous of [sic] the state-compelled dual school system has lingering ef-
fects in the Kansas City, Missouri School District.
Id. (citations to record omitted).
82. Record at 16,457-58, Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (No. 77-420-CV-W),
aff d, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987).
83. According to the district court, examples of such harms would be "racial bias in the tests
administered by RPS, discrimination in the manner in which students are selected for various educa-
tional programs and inadequacy of current RPS teachers due to their attendance in inferior, segre-
gated schools in RPS." 639 F. Supp. at 690.
84. For an analysis of the Milliken II opinion, see supra Section I.
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the Bradley court, the "primary defect" in segregated school systems is the
"separate and inferior" treatment of blacks inherent in such systems:
"The elimination of the vestiges of segregation, in areas such as student
achievement, is ancillary to and separate from the primary goal of elimi-
nating the segregation itself"' 5 Further, the Court asserted that "[t]he
Constitution does not guarantee those students who have never personally
been subjected to de jure school segregation the right to be free of all of
the effects of prior segregation; rather, it only requires that such students
be provided a non-discriminatory education. '8
This legal conclusion simply ignores Milliken HI, which authorizes com-
pensatory education programs necessary to remedy the effects of discrimi-
nation on both "the victims of segregation and the school system itself.""7
Even the Bradley court recognized that federal courts have never required
school desegregation plaintiffs to have attended a de jure segregated school
before granting relief for systemic harms such as segregated attendance
patterns or racially identifiable schools. Such a requirement would violate
long-established Supreme Court desegregation jurisprudence which recog-
nizes a continuing obligation on the part of school boards to eliminate all
the effects of the violation, even as late as twenty-five years after state-
mandated or intentional segregation has ceased."' The Bradley court's
constitutional "contribution," upheld by the Fourth Circuit, is to demand
that plaintiffs have attended the school system if they seek relief for indi-
vidualized harms.8 9
In limiting the scope of individualized relief, the Bradley court misread
dicta in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education which
states that "[o]ne vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage."9"
85. 639 F. Supp. at 688 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 691.
87. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984), affg 567 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D.
Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
88. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
458-461 (1979); see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973) (recognizing duty to
remedy continuing effects); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(same); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1504 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Brown II, Green, Swann,
Keyes and Dayton II, among other cases, stand for proposition that having created a dual system, state
and school district have continuing obligation to disestablish it), affld, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987).
89. But see Jenkins, 593 F. Supp at 1490, 1492 (finding low achievement levels of students at-
tending Kansas City schools in 1984 remediable as lingering effects of state-compelled dual school
system that existed in 1954); Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (ordering remedy).
None of the federal courts that have ordered Milliken II relief for individualized educational depri-
vation have limited their remedies to students who had been enrolled in the de jure segregated school
system. In fact, many remedial programs are targeted to pre-school and elementary school children,
who are too young to have attended the segregated system. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 585 F. Supp.
453, 455-56 (N.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Tasby v. Black Coalition to Maximize Educ., 771
F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 28-34 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd, 807
F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344,
372 (W.D. Mich. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983).
90. Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 691 (E.D. Va. 1986); see also School Bd. of Richmond
v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting same dicta).
19881 1187
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1173
Contrary to the Bradley court's interpretation, the Swann Court was not
referring to effects caused by unlawful school segregation but rather to
harms inflicted by other kinds of discrimination, whether governmental or
private:
The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large
task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve
broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities.
One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would
not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use school
desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although deseg-
regation of schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of
discrimination.9
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's misuse of Swann, stating
that although a state-mandated dual school system admittedly inflicts pov-
erty on the students who receive an inferior education, a "school desegre-
gation plan cannot remedy these general societal ills, even when they indi-
rectly affect current students .... Educational deficiencies that result from
problems such as poverty are best remedied by programs directed toward
eliminating poverty, not by indirect solutions through school programs." 9
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion does not withstand close analysis.
First, the issue is not one of remedying "general societal ills" or "educa-
tional deficiencies that result from problems such as poverty" but those
deficits which have been caused by segregation-linked poverty.93 Second,
91. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971) (emphasis added).
The Bradley court opined that educational relief for students attending RPS would necessitate state
provision of direct compensation to individuals whose low income could be attributed to the prior
segregation. However, the Supreme Court long ago precluded such a remedy by opting for equitable
relief as the remedy for school segregation, rather than punitive or compensatory damages. See Brown
11, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For a discussion of the considerations which probably affected the Court's
choice, see Shane, supra note 72, at 1044-47.
The Eleventh Amendment also bars damage awards against states; indeed, Milliken II itself clearly
distinguishes the provision of compensatory education from mere damage awards, finding the former
permissible because it involves prospective injunctive relief. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 289-90 &
n.21. This is not to suggest that any type of injunctive remedy would permissibly fall within the scope
of Milliken I. For example, a post-graduation job training program for the victims of segregation
arguably would be beyond the scope of relief because it would involve the creation and administration
of new programs in areas of expertise beyond the knowledge and capability of school authorities.
Where the sole remedy is educational remediation for children within the school system, the only
practical burden is cost. However, as the district court in Jenkins made clear, "a consideration of [the]
practicalities does not mean that the vindication of constitutional rights can be denied on 'any theory
that it is less expensive to deny them than afford them.'" 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963)), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987).
92. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987).
93. For an important refutation of the approach to discrimination which the Bradley court and
the Fourth Circuit assumed in this case, see B. BrrixER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 27
(1973): "Should no wrongs be corrected unless all can be? . . . [W]e constantly compare competing
demands for the redress of injustice, knowing full well that the pit is bottomless, especialy since the
amelioration of one ill can cause a previously tolerable condition to seem degrading by comparison."
However, Bittker's inquiry, like this Note, "presupposes a society that is prepared to respond to the
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it is not the role of the federal courts to relinquish a constitutional viola-
tor's duty to eliminate the effects of its own unconstitutional behavior by
passing the buck to other governmental programs or actors lying beyond
the jurisdiction of the courts."' Third, even if we focus on "best" remedies,
programs aimed at eliminating poverty are not the "best" remedy for edu-
cational deficiencies existing in current school-age children. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a more suitable, let alone a more direct, solution for
remedying the educational problems of students currently enrolled in a
school system than providing compensatory education programs.
In sum, contrary to the recent Bradley and Fourth Circuit opinions,
neither Milliken II nor the Supreme Court's general principles for limit-
ing the exercise of equitable discretion in school desegregation cases pre-
clude courts from ordering educational relief to remedy individualized
harms that can be linked through socioeconomic injury to prior segrega-
tion. Legal recognition of these effects affirms equitable principles and is
firmly within the discretion of federal courts: the established role of local
school authorities can be "maintained inviolate"; the remedy is "indeed
remedial"; and the order neither "punish[es] anyone," nor does it "impair
or jeopardize [an] educational system.""5
III. UNITARY STATUS AND COMPENSATORY EDUCATION RELIEF
Federal circuit courts and legal commentators have largely ignored or
minimized Milliken I in their attempt to set forth instructions for the
identification of unitary school systems."6 As a result, school desegregation
most meritorious of these claims, rather than dismissing all of them as man's ineluctable fate." See id.
94. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (1984) ("[When] defendants have failed to
comply with their constitutional obligations, this Court not only has the power but the duty to enter a
decree which will correct the continuing effects of past discrimination as well as bar discrimination
against blacks in the future.") (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)), aff d,
807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); see also Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968).
95. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 288; see also supra note 24.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing pre-Milliken
/1 case, Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976)) ("having once implemented a racially
neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the
defendants, the District Court has fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy
for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns"); School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829
F.2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 1987) (court does "not reject the possibility that in some circumstances it
might be appropriate to use factors other than the kind described in Green"); United States v. Law-
rence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. 1986) (unitary school district is one "in
which schools are not identifiable by race and students and faculty are assigned in a manner that
eliminates the vestiges of past segregation"); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.)
(unitary status achieved upon finding of integration in Green factors: faculty, staff, transportation
practices, extracurricular activities, facilities and pupil assignment), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986); Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 41, 60 (1986)
(proposing standard for unitariness that looks only at Green factors); Note, supra note 47, at 662
(citing Green, Swann, Alexander, and Keyes as precedent relevant to unitariness issue, ignoring Milli-
ken I1). But see Note, Unitary School Systems and Underl)ing Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 794, 801-02 (1987) (recognizing need to eliminate effects of segregation on
student achievement and educational programs, although minimizing effort required to eliminate sys-
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decrees may be wrongly terminated, without adequate attention to the
unique systemic harms infecting a school system or the individualized
harms borne by its pupils. Premature declarations of unitary status deny
victims of segregation their right to full remediation of the violation and
all of its effects.
Although the legal significance of a finding of unitary status has not
been fully elaborated by the Supreme Court, the Court's limited discus-
sion of the issue in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion" indicates that judicial oversight of a violator school district will
cease upon a declaration that a unitary school system has been achieved. 8
A finding of unitary status would thus terminate outstanding desegrega-
tion decrees9" and eliminate the presumption that discriminatory effects
are caused by the school district's purposeful action.1"' Thereafter, plain-
tiffs would have to prove intentional segregation if they sought any change
in school district practices.1"' In effect, a declaration of unitariness would
eliminate the legal relevance of the original constitutional violation.
Although the Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence has not pro-
vided guidelines for determining when unitary status itself has been
achieved,"0 2 it does provide some clues for the way in which lower federal
temic harms).
97. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
98.
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compli-
ance with this Court's decision in Brown . The systems would then be 'unitary' . . . . This
does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the
absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has
deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of
the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.
402 U.S. at 31-32.
99. See Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175 (attaining unitary status means end of judicial superinten-
dence); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 1987) ("one thing certain about unitariness is
its consequences: the mandatory devolution of power to local authorities"); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535
("[O]nce the goal of a unitary school system is achieved, the district court's role ends."); Note, supra
note 96, at 795. But see Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding of
unitariness does not divest a court of its jurisdiction without specific dissolution of ongoing desegrega-
tion decree), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986); Terez, supra note 96, at 60-65 (inherent in finding
of unitariness should be injunction requiring permanent maintenance of unitary school system).
100. See supra note 47.
101. See Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175 (end of judicial superintendence means more than absence of
injunction and pending suit; school district must be released from burden of proving its decisions are
free of segregative purpose); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538 ("burden of proving discriminatory intent
attaches to a plaintiff once a de jure segregated school system has been found to be unitary"). But see
Note, supra note 47, at 669 (1987) (even after finding of unitary status defendants retain burden of
proving that reestablishment of dual school system is not intentional after showing by plaintiffs of
substantial resegregation); Morgan, 831 F.2d at 326 n.19 (citing Note, supra note 47, recognizing a
"possibility" that some burden might fall on defendants even after finding of unitariness).
102. The Supreme Court has held that once a plaintiff has proved the existence of unlawful
segregation, a school system is under a continuing duty to take whatever steps are necessary to com-
pletely eliminate racial discrimination and its effects. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979); Co-
lumbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
Prior to a finding of unitary status, the school board shoulders the burden of proving that its actions
or inaction have not perpetuated the effects of the illegal dual system. See Dayton I at 537-38;
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courts should proceed when considering unitary status. For example, the
Court in Milliken II eschewed a formulaic response to desegregation, rec-
ognizing the uniqueness of each constitutional violation."0 3 Thus, rather
than looking to an external definition of unitariness, °4 a district court
considering conferring unitary status on a violator school district should
instead determine whether the particular effects in the case before it have
been eliminated.
Some circuit courts now struggling to identify unitary school systems 05
appear to have forgotten the Supreme Court's admonition to defer to par-
ticularized fact-finding and remediation. Instead, they have transformed
certain systemic factors-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular ac-
tivities, and facilities-that the Supreme Court pointed to in Green v.
County School Board as indicative of racial identifiability, into pre-
determined criteria for assessing progress toward unitary status."' °
The circuit courts' misplaced reliance on Green overlooks the preceden-
Vaughns v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985). A school
board's progress toward achieving unitary status is measured not by its good intentions but by its
effectiveness. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) ("The measure of any
desegregation plan is its effectiveness."); Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 538; Green, 391 U.S. at 439
("[W]hatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain jurisdic-
tion until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed."). But see Morgan v.
Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) (whether school defendants have demonstrated good faith in
desegregation effort and operation of schools is factor to be considered in determining unitary status);
United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1987) (desegregation case settled by consent
decree calling for court to retain jurisdiction for only three years, after which Austin Independent
School district would be declared unitary, and case dismissed absent objection).
103. The Court has traditionally left it to the lower federal courts to give content to general
principles in light of local realities:
This Court has from the beginning looked to the District Courts in desegregation cases, famil-
iar as they are with the local situations coming before them, to appraise the efforts of local
school authorities to carry out their constitutionally required duties. 'Because of their proxim-
ity to local conditions ... the [federal district] courts which originally heard these cases can
best perform this judicial appraisal.'
Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 287 n.18 (quoting Brown I1, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)).
104. For an attempt to provide courts with such a definition, see Terez, supra note 96, at 60:
'Unitariness,' as a remedy to racially segregated public schools, entails the unavoidably diffi-
cult transition from racially identifiable schools to fully integrated schools where no distinc-
tions are made on the basis of race in such key areas as faculty, staff, transportation, extracur-
ricular activities, facilities, and student bodies. Furthermore, 'unitariness' calls for the
elimination of all vestiges of racial discrimination in public schools and the maintenance of
public schools which cannot be identified on the basis of race in any of the key areas.
105. Although the Supreme Court has always spoken in terms of the achievement of a unitary
school system, one circuit court has concluded that unitary status may be conferred in an incremental
fashion. See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 318-19 (wrongly citing Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,
436-37 (1976), for proposition that a district court may confer unitary status on pupil assignments
even if other facets of the school system retain discriminatory vestiges).
106. See supra note 96 (discussing United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir.
1987); School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. 1986); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d
521, 533 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986)). But see Green, 391 U.S. at 439:
The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a
proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no universal answer to complex problems
of desegregation: there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter
must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each
instance.
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tial significance of subsequent Supreme Court case law, which has ex-
panded judicial recognition of the remediable effects of segregation. As
noted above, the Supreme Court has discussed at length the effect that
unlawful school construction and dosing policies can have on residential
segregation, and declared that such an effect must be considered in assess-
ing the effectiveness of a pupil assignment remedy.10 7 And in Milliken II,
the Court not only extended its conception of the systemic vestiges that
may require elimination before unitary status can be achieved beyond that
it had articulated in Green, but recognized that the individualized effects
of unlawful segregation may also need remediation. 1 8 Thus, before mov-
ing to terminate an outstanding school desegregation decree, a federal
court must ensure that the particular effects in the case at hand, whether
racially-skewed assignment policies, segregated housing patterns, or low
achievement scores, have been eliminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ten years ago, Milliken II created an opportunity for the complete
elimination of unlawful segregation and its continuing effects. Many
lower federal courts have seized upon its broadly stated corrective princi-
ples to provide extensive compensatory education relief. Although the Su-
preme Court recognized that the harms of segregation affect both individ-
uals and the educational system, some recent decisions have minimized or
failed to apply this holding. The Fourth Circuit's recent move to limit the
cognizable effects of compensatory education remedies undermines the Su-
preme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence and should be rejected
by other circuits. Finally, the emerging case law in the area of termination
of school desegregation remedies must recognize that remedying unlawful
segregation and its effects may require educational compensation for its
victims.
107. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 96, at 802 ("A
busing plan is not so much intended to eliminate underlying residential segregation . . . as it is to
counteract the resulting segregation in neighborhood schools. The consequence of this distinction is
that successful implementation of a desegregation plan does not permanently eradicate underlying
vestiges, they remain lurking beneath the plan.").
The importance of eliminating residential segregation caused by intentional school segregation has
become apparent in three recent cases in which a finding of unitariness was followed by a return to
neighborhood school assignment plans that resulted in a substantial increase in the number of all-
black schools within the district. See, e.g, United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir.
1987); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 536 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986);
Note, supra note 96, at 809.
108. See supra Section I.
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